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Introduction 
One result of the momentous political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 
recent years is that all countries in the region have now embarked on the fundamental 
transformation of their economic systems from central planning to a market economy. 
The economic services of the Commission have since 1989 sought to complement the 
Community's economic assistance efforts (through the PHARE programme and other 
actions) by conducting and commissioning relevant economic analysis. This has already 
led to several publications in the main European Economy series: No. 43, 'Economic 
transformation in Hungary and Poland', March 1990; No. 45, 'Stabilization, 
liberalization and devolution : assessment of the economic situation and reform process 
in the Soviet Union', December 1990; Special Edition No. 2, 'The path of reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe', 1991. 
Now, for the first time, a short assessment of the economic situation and the progress of 
reform is published in Supplement A ; it attempts to give a snapshot of the situation, 
focusing on recent developments (until end-July 1991) but placing them in the context of 
the process of systemic change which is now under way. 
A caveat is in order here. The statistical apparatus of the countries in transition, based as 
it is on the requisites of the now-defunct planning system, is ill-suited f or the type of 
comparative analysis that is usually presented in this series. Although efforts to improve 
the situation are being made in all countries concerned, even quite basic macroeconomic 
indicators are as yet either unavailable or compiled according to a methodology that 
differs substantially from what is used in the Community. The figures quoted below 
therefore need to be treated with great caution ; in particular, they cannot be readily 
compared across countries. 
2 — 
Bulgaria 
The deterioration in economic performance that occurred in 1990 
has continued in 1991. Real GDP fell by more than 11 per cent in 
1990 as a result of severe external shocks, structural constraints 
and domestic policy mistakes. The value of production for the first 
six months of 1991 fell by 22.6 per cent compared to the same 
period in 1990. The main causes were a shortage of raw materials 
and a loss of markets. 
Retail prices went up by 84 % in 1990, with the highest price 
increases concentrated in September-December. Prices of food-
stuffs, household items and furniture more than doubled with 
respect to 1989, while clothing and footwear increased by 76 %. 
The price of water and rents rose the least (11%). Price 
liberalization in February led to sharp increases amounting to 
230 % in February and March together. At the end of March 
prices were 280 % higher than at end-December, and 470 % above 
end-May 1990. However, the latest figures released show that 
inflation fell to virtually nil in April and May. The price of fuel was 
increased by between 70 % (electricity and coal) and 113 % (gas) 
on 3 June. 
Unemployment is increasing. In December about 63,000 people 
were unemployed, and the number rose to 206,000 at end-May 
1991. The projected level for the end of the year of 350,000 seems 
to be optimistic. 
BULGARIA - Main economic 
GDP at constant prices (a) 
Industrial production (a) 
Agricultural production (a) 
Consumer price index (a) 
Unemployment rate, % 
Trade balance, $ bn 
Current account, $ bn 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn 
(a) Percentage change over (same period 
indicators 
1989 
-0.3 
-2.6 
-4.8 
6.4 
0.0 
-0.8 
-0.7 
9.2 
of) previous year. 
1990 
-11.3 
-16.0 
-6 .0 
26.3 
1.4 
-1 .0 
-0.8 
10.0 
1991 Ql 
— 
— 
— 
470.0 
8.1 
-0.1 
— 
11.0 
Figures for the first six months of the year show that Bulgaria's 
trade deficit had fallen to zero. However, this positive tendency 
should be seen in the context of sharply reduced export and import 
volumes caused by the collapse of CMEA trade and reduced 
domestic production. In value terms exports fell by 56 per cent in 
the first half of the year while imports decreased by 63 per cent in 
the same period. The reduction in hard-currency exports has 
exacerbated the precarious external financial situation. On 17 
April Bulgaria obtained an arrangement with the Paris Club, 
which recommended deferral and rescheduling of all debt servicing 
payments to official creditors, including arrears on short-term 
credits. Debt servicing on medium- and long-term debt has been 
rescheduled over a period of ten years with a grace period of six 
years. 1 January 1991 was set as the cut-off date. However, the 
greater part of the debt — about 80 % of the total — is owed to 
commercial banks, with which the government is seeking a long-
term arrangement. The authorities hope to settle the commercial 
debt problem by exploring with the banks a range of options, 
including debt reduction, preferential interest rates, debt-equity 
swaps, as well as new financing. 
At the end of September 1990 Bulgaria joined the IMF and the 
IBRD. In February 1991 the IMF approved a drawing under the 
compensatory and contingency financing facility to assist with the 
increased cost of oil imports. In March 1991, it approved a twelve-
month stand-by arrangement for SDR 279 million. 
A comprehensive stabilization programme was elaborated in 
collaboration with the IMF, which began to be implemented in 
February 1991. Measures undertaken so far include: 
• a tax reform, together with a set of measures to curtail state 
expenditures, to reduce subsidies, and to limit the state budget 
deficit to 3.5 % of GDP; 
• a massive liberalization of prices, with the overwhelming 
majority of prices determined freely, prices for four energy 
products administratively set, and those of 14 categories of 
goods subject to a special monitoring system; 
• a restrictive incomes policy providing for an initial reduction of 
real wages followed by a freeze, with the consent of the trade 
unions ; 
• a set of measures to reduce the monetary overhang and to 
introduce a restrictive monetary policy ; 
• the introduction of a new exchange rate system providing for a 
single exchange rate determined on the basis of supply and 
demand. At the same time the foreign trade regime was 
significantly liberalized. 
In March 1991 a new land law was adopted, which allows for land 
to be returned to the previous owners. New legislation on trade, 
foreign investment and privatization is still pending. 
On 12 July the parliament approved a new constitution, paving the 
way for a general election on 29 September. The new constitution 
guarantees basic human rights, recognizes various forms of 
property ownership, including private and state, and defines the 
powers of the government and president. It also guarantees the 
validity of all international treaties and conventions approved by 
previous parliaments. Although the new constitution obtained 
more than the two-thirds parliamentary majority required, it also 
led to protests from opposition MPs, about twenty of whom went 
on hunger strike. 
Czechoslovakia 
Fundamental economic reform in Czechoslovakia started in 
earnest only in January 1991. The first year after the 'velvet 
revolution' was mainly devoted to a political restructuring of the 
country, and to discussion and preparation of the transition to a 
market economy. The uncertainty created by the abolition of the 
command system and by the lack of progress with reform had an 
adverse effect on economic performance. This was exacerbated by 
shortfalls in supplies of energy and raw materials from the Soviet 
Union and by sharply reduced export possibilities following the 
breakdown of the CMEA trading system. 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA - Main economic 
Net Material Product constant prices (a) 
Industrial production (a) 
Agricultural production (a) 
Consumer price index (a) 
Unemployment rate, % of labour force 
Trade balance, $ bn 
Current account balance, $ bn 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn 
indicators 
1989 
3.1 
1.0 
1.3 
1.4 
0.0 
0.2 
1.0 
7.9 
1990 
2.3 
-3.7 
-3.9 
10.0 
1.0 
-1.3 
-0 .4 
8.1 
1991 Ql 
-1.7 
-9 .2 
— 
54.7 
2.3 
-0 .4 
— 
8.3 
(a) Percentage change over (same period of) previous year. 
The tensions between the Czech and Slovak republics which came 
out into the open after the end of communist rule needed to be 
addressed before full-scale economic reform could be con-
templated. Although the devolution issue is very far from having 
taken on the violent and destructive character it has in the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, it has slowed down economic reform and 
continues to dominate policy debates. In particular Slovakia, the 
smaller and less developed of the two republics, has during the past 
year repeatedly resisted economic reform measures at the federal 
level ; it contends that it is less able to cope with rapid industrial 
restructuring — for instance, much of the country's armaments 
manufacturers and heavy industry are in Slovakia. The Czech 
republic, although stressing its independence in many areas, 
appears to be less opposed to assigning significant economic policy 
responsibilities to the federation. 
Some progress towards a mutually acceptable division of powers 
was made in early 1991. In particular, it was agreed how tax 
revenue (which is entirely federal) was to be distributed : 40 % to 
the federal authorities, 35 % to the Czech republic, and 25 % to 
the Slovak republic. The major blocks of expenditure for which the 
republics are responsible are infrastructure, education, justice and 
health. Defence is entirely a federal responsibility, and social 
expenditure is divided between the federal and republic levels. 
Czechoslovakia's economic performance deteriorated markedly 
during 1990, even though a collapse of the order observed in 
Bulgaria or Romania was avoided. Industrial production fell by 
3.7 %, and consumer price inflation rose from very low levels to 
10 %. Unemployment was still low but rising rapidly. The trade 
and current account balances moved from surplus into deficit in 
1990 as the Soviet Union reduced its oil deliveries by 30 % ; this oil, 
which was very cheap by international standards, had to be 
replaced from other sources at a much higher price and at higher 
transport costs. Under the CMEA trading system Czechoslovakia 
used to obtain Soviet energy and raw materials at prices 
significantly below world market levels. 
A comprehensive package of measures went into effect in January 
1991 which combined wide-ranging liberalization with strict 
macroeconomic control: 
• Prices for 86 % of retail sales were freed, with controls 
remaining in place for rents, public utilities, energy and some 
foodstuffs. This led to a higher-than-expected initial jump in the 
consumer price level: 25.8% in the first month, 7 .1% in 
February and 4.7 % in March. It tapered off to 2 % in April and 
May, but an increase in retail energy prices in May will have 
added another 5 % to the price level. 
• At the end of December 1990, the exchange rate was unified at 
Kcs 28 per $ (i.e., devaluation of 14 % for commercial and non-
commercial transactions, and revaluation of 12 % for tourism). 
At the same time, 'internal convertibility' was introduced, which 
provides unlimited access to foreign exchange for trading 
purposes. The government's commitment to defending the new 
rate — which has so far been quite successful — makes the 
exchange rate the reform programme's 'nominal anchor'. 
• By way of a 'real anchor', a wages and incomes policy was 
agreed with the trade unions and enterprises which contains a 
formula for partial indexation intended to limit the fall in real 
wages to about 10 % in 1991 ; in fact, the decline was closer to 
20 % at the end of May. 
• A temporary 20 % import surcharge on food and consumer 
goods was introduced in January 1991 ; it was lowered to 15 % 
from June. 
• Monetary and fiscal policies are very restrictive. By mid-year, 
the consolidated surplus was even substantially higher than 
originally planned (Kcs 8 billion, or nearly 1 % of GDP, for the 
year as a whole), essentially because of the much higher rise in 
prices and thus in profits tax receipts. To avoid excessively 
contractionary effects, substantial additional spending was 
therefore approved in early July 1991. The paradoxical 
coincidence of falling sales and output with higher-than-
expected price rises, rising profits and a budget surplus indicates 
that price increases have often been excessive and enterprise 
behaviour is still quite monopolistic. 
Industrial output has suffered more than anticipated; it fell by 
15 % during the first five months of 1991, compared with the same 
period of last year. The authorities claim that the main cause for 
this is not linked to domestic economic reform, but to the collapse 
of trade with the Soviet Union. In theory, since 1 January 1991 
intra-CMEA trade has had to be conducted at world market 
prices and settled in convertible currency; in practice, the 
transition is being effected somewhat more gradually, with trade 
continuing in parton a clearing basis, at least for the current year. 
Nevertheless, export volume has fallen substantially (-35 % for the 
first quarter), and import prices have risen steeply. 
A sharp distinction has been made between 'small' and 'large' 
privatization. Small privatization started at the end of January and 
is to be completed by mid-year. For large privatization, highly 
complex legislation was adopted only on 26 February and 
provides for a voucher scheme to distribute ownership among the 
population, as well as for auctions where foreigners can 
participate. The first privatizations under the new rules are being 
prepared, but the process is likely to be slow. 
Some other major reform measures are also progressing only 
slowly. Major legal changes are still needed, such as a bankruptcy 
law, resolution of contract disputes, and anti-trust law. The 
introduction of a VAT-type turnover tax is foreseen for 1993. 
Hungary 
The Hungarian economy has embarked on a major effort of 
stabilization and medium-term adjustment, designed to transform 
Hungary into a competitive market economy. For the time being, 
however, economic stabilization and the reform effort have 
contributed to a decline in economic activity. Recession has been 
accelerated by the breakdown of the CMEA trading system. 
Results for 1990 and the first five months of 1991 point to a severe 
contraction of economic activity, although it is not completely 
clear to what extent official statistics are able to take into account 
the increasing rate of expansion of private activity. Real GDP 
declined by 5 % with respect to the previous year and industrial 
production by more than 10 %, as a result of the collapse of 
demand within the CMEA and the depressed condition of the 
domestic market. 
HUNGARY - Main economic 
GDP at constant prices (a) 
Industrial production (a) 
Agricultural production (a) 
Consumer price index (a) 
Unemployment rate, % 
Trade balance, $ bn 
Current account, $ bn 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn 
(a) Percentage change over (same perioc 
indicators 
1989 
-2.8 
-0.5 
1.2 
17.0 
0.0 
1.0 
-1.4 
20.6 
of) previous year. 
1990 
-5.0 
-10.5 
-4 .0 
28.9 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
21.8 
1991 Ql 
-4.3 
-12.3 
2.8 
34.2 
03 
0.5 
0.2 
— 
Tight fiscal policy led to a reduction in the state budget deficit, 
reported at Ft 1.4 bn (i.e. less than 1 % of GDP) for 1990. Despite 
a restrictive monetary policy, inflation increased during 1990: the 
consumer price index rose by 30 % on a yearly basis. 
The performance of the economy in the first months of 1991 has 
been mixed. Industrial production continues to decline and 
unemployment is increasing at a faster rate. However, inflation is 
lower than forecast. 
Industrial production declined by 15 % in volume terms in the first 
five months of 1991 compared with the same period last year. The 
number of registered unemployed increased to 185,500 by the end 
of May, corresponding to 3.9 % of the work-force. Actual 
unemployment has been increasing, especially in those sectors 
more dependent on exports to the Soviet Union. However, the 
informal sector of the economy and the dynamic development of 
small enterprises have been able to absorb part of the shock. 
Unemployment forecasts for the end of 1991 vary between 260,000 
and 400,000. 
Monthly price increases have slowed continuously from January, 
when consumer prices increased by 7.5 % with respect to the 
previous month. In March the increase was 3.5 %, and in April 
2.4 %. For the year to May the annual consumer price increase 
was 34.8 %. However, price inflation is expected to resume 
somewhat in the second part of the year, especially since subsidies 
on energy supplies to households were withdrawn from 1 June. 
In spite of unfavourable external shocks, the performance of the 
external sector was positive in 1990. A surplus of $127 million was 
recorded in convertible currency trade, which implies a dramatic 
improvement with respect to 1989, when a deficit of $1.4 billion 
was recorded. This result was achieved despite an unexpected 
shortfall in Soviet oil deliveries and higher oil prices on the world 
market in the last quarter of 1990. Moreover, the collapse of 
CMEA trade led to a loss of nearly one-third of traditional 
exports. 
This positive performance spilled over into the first quarter of 1991 
but the latest figures issued by the Ministry of International 
Economic Relations show a $950m deficit in Hungarian 
convertible trade for the first five months of the year. National 
Bank of Hungary (NBH) statistics for the same period put the 
deficit at only $151m. The discrepancy is due to the different basis 
on which the figures are calculated. Whereas the Ministry arrives 
at its figures on the basis of goods crossing borders, the NBH uses 
a system of payments actually registered. The Hungarian 
government and the IMF have recently concurred on a forecast 
for the trade deficit for the year of approximately $800m. 
However, economists at the NBH are optimistic that an even 
lower figure could be achieved because of a partial recovery in 
trade with the Soviet Union, a lower than expected oil price and a 
lower overall demand for oil. 
The programme of structural reform proceeds, especially for 
privatization. The State Property Agency (SPA) has launched 
several programmes that should lead to the privatization of over 
50 % of state enterprises by 1994. However, the rejection of the 
Compensation Bill by the Constitutional Court, after its approval 
by the National Assembly, may slow down somewhat the 
privatization process. The Finance Ministry has put forward new 
proposals designed to increase the efficiency of the privatization 
process, involving a higher degree of decentralization and a more 
restricted role for the SPA. 
In the meantime the Hungarian government has drawn up a list of 
19 key enterprises that are to remain in complete or majority state 
ownership. The list includes the energy and telecommunications 
network, the post office, Malev airline, state television, the 
aluminium sector, the railways, and the biggest saving banks. 
Poland 
The declining trends which were strongly evident in the Polish 
economy during 1989 were exacerbated by the radical stabilization 
measures introduced on 1 January 1990. The stabilization 
programme provided for : price liberalization and an end to most 
subsidies; a devaluation of the zloty and the introduction of 
convertibility for current transactions; strict control of wage rises 
above stipulated levels; a significant reduction in real wages; a 
reduction in the state budget deficit to 1 per cent of GDP. 
The stabilization programme helped to reduce significantly 
hyperinflation from a monthly rate of 78.9 % in January 1990 to 
1.8% in August. During the second half of 1990 inflation 
stabilized at around the 5 % level (month-on-month) and was 
250 % for the whole year (December-to-December). Prices rose 
steeply in January 1991 (12.7 %), an event attributed to one-off 
utility price rises, but have since declined gradually to a monthly 
level of about 2.5 % (32.6 % for the first five months of the year or 
67.8 % year-on-year to May 1991). The government has revised its 
initial forecast for inflation this year from 36 % to 55 % but even 
this target might be substantially exceeded. The slowing of 
inflation has prompted the National Bank to lower the key interest 
rate from 72 % in January to 50 % in July. During the past few 
months the government has been facing mounting pressures from 
trade unions for a relaxation of strict wage controls in the state 
sector and from farmers for minimum guaranteed agricultural 
prices and protection against EC imports. As a result, higher 
tariffs on food imports were introduced in May. 
POLAND - Main economic indicators 
1989 1990 1991 Ql 
Net Material Product constant prices (a) 
Industrial production (a) 
Agricultural production (a) 
Consumer price index (a) 
Unemployment rate, % of labour force 
Trade balance, $ bn 
Current account balance, $ bn 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn 
0.2 
-2.9 
2.0 
640.0 
0.1 
0.2 
—1.8 
43.3 
-13.0 
-23.0 
250.0 
6.1 
2.2 
0.7 
46.5 
-9 .3 
88.2 
8.4 
-0.3 
— 
48.5 
(a) Percentage change over (same period of) previous year. 
Stabilization has resulted in significantly lower levels of economic 
activity. GDP declined by 12% in 1990 ( + 0.2% in 1989). 
Industrial production in the state sector fell by 23 %, although the 
overall effect was mitigated by an 8.5 % rise in private sector 
output. Gross agricultural production, however, increased by 
2.5 % over 1989. During the first five months of 1991 industrial 
output fell by a further 8.6 % compared to December 1990. The 
pronounced decline in economic activity resulted in a growing 
deficit for the state budget ($1.03bn or 4.2 % of the GDP by 
April), which was mostly due to lower tax revenues from the 
corporate sector. Unemployment rose from negligible levels at the 
start of 1990 to 1.5 million in June 1991 (8.5 % of the work force) 
and could reach two million at the end of 1991. 
In 1990 Poland achieved a hard-currency trade surplus of $2.2bn, 
despite having to buy more oil at higher world market prices 
because of a 35 % reduction in Soviet deliveries. Export receipts 
rose by 43 % on the previous year to $10.9bn as enterprises turned 
to the external sector to compensate for the fall in domestic 
demand, while import expenditures rose by 18 % to $8.6 bn. Net 
official reserves rose by more than $2.1bn. 
Trade prospects appear markedly worse for 1991 as a result of 
higher energy prices, the shift to hard-currency settlement of trade 
with other East European countries, the loss of markets in the 
former East Germany and the collapse of exports to the USSR (-
60 % for first quarter of 1991 compared with the same period in 
1990). Total imports for January-April 1991 jumped by 124.1 % 
on a year earlier while exports rose by 31.4 %. In response to 
growing pressures from exporters and in an effort to promote an 
export-led recovery of output levels, the government devalued the 
zloty by 14.4% on 17 May 1991, following 16 months of 
exchange-rate stability, and announced that in future the value of 
the zloty would be fixed against a basket of convertible currencies. 
Poland had been unable to service fully its external debt of $48.5bn 
(February 1991), since 1981. This situation has recently been 
alleviated by a debt reduction from the Paris Club of creditor 
governments, which account for about three-quarters of the 
country's total debt. The agreement, which will reduce the net 
present value of the debt by fifty per cent, is formally dependent on 
the implementation of an IMF-approved three-year economic 
programme. However, Poland has failed to meet the IMF 
performance criteria relating to its budget deficit, rate of inflation 
and foreign reserve level for June 1991. Polish authorities have 
indicated their intention to request a considerable easing of IMF 
terms at the first semi-annual review, scheduled for August 1991. 
The Polish government has been carrying out parallel negotiations 
on the $10.6 bn owed to private banks, plus $1.2bn of overdue 
interest. These talks have been deadlocked on the banks' insistence 
that Poland pays $250 m of its interest arrears before any 
discussions on restructuring the principal of the country's bank 
debt begin. 
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The experience of the past few months suggests that macroecon-
omic stabilization is only the first stage of systemic economic 
reform. Popular support for the stabilization programme has 
weakened because of the protracted recession and the sharp 
decline of real wages. Profound structural adjustments still need to 
be implemented in the months to come, including large-scale 
privatization and legislation which will provide Poland with the 
basic institutions of a free market economy. This task has been 
rendered considerably more difficult by the lack of a stable 
government majority in the Sejm (Parliament), which is still largely 
dominated by the communists and their allies. Parliamentary 
elections are scheduled to take place in October 1991. 
The privatization programme, which got off to a rather slow start 
in 1990, has been accelerated this year. A large number of small 
and medium-sized enterprises have already been privatized 
through a system of quick sales by auction. The government aims 
to transfer to the private sector about half of Poland's 8,000 
enterprises during the next three years. A number of methods are 
being used to achieve this goal, including outright sales of state-
owned enterprises, public offers of shares on the open market and 
privatization through liquidation (changing the legal status of an 
enterprise in order to sell it). However, the most ambitious scheme 
involves the privatization of 400 state-owned firms, accounting for 
a quarter of the country's industrial sales and 12 per cent of total 
employment. The government intends that 60 % of the shares in 
the commercialized companies will be distributed free to all adult 
citizens, 30 % will be held by the State Treasury and 10 % given 
to the employees. Special investment groups will be set up in order 
to restructure and manage the companies on behalf of the 
shareholders. The market value of the shares will only be 
determined in 1993, following the publication of the companies' 
first-year results. 
The privatization process is complicated by the absence of a sound 
commercial banking system. A two-tier banking system has been 
created, and the liberal licensing policy has resulted in the creation 
of about sixty new private banks, half of which are privately 
owned while the rest belong to state enterprises. Nonetheless, the 
foreign exchange market is still tightly controlled by the National 
Bank; the money market is embryonic; and there is only 
rudimentary experience in credit analysis and accounting. The 
government is anxious to speed up banking sector reform and to 
put an end to the existing system of inter-enterprise credits so that 
banks can if necessary force uncompetitive firms to go bankrupt. 
Finally, a thorough reform of the country's public finances is 
under way. The taxation system is being overhauled, with efforts 
to increase tax revenues from the rapidly expanding private sector 
in order to make up for falling revenues from unprofitable state 
enterprises ( 15 % less than planned in the first quarter of 1991). A 
law introducing personal income tax has been passed by 
Parliament, while value added tax is scheduled to be introduced in 
early 1992. The budgetary procedure will also need to be 
streamlined so as to improve controls on government spending. 
However, the necessary legislation has yet to be enacted and the 
administrative structure which would manage the new system is 
not in place. 
Romania 
Romania is in the midst of a deep recession. The shortages of food 
and other basic commodities, which were endemic under the 
previous regime, have been reduced but not eliminated. In April 
1991 industrial production was 19.7 % lower than a year earlier, 
and public investment was 28.6 % down. The price level more 
than doubled in six months. Exports have collapsed and a 
convertible currency current account deficit of $0.5 billion was 
recorded for the first quarter of 1991 ; there is little room for a 
further deterioration since Romania's access to foreign credit is 
virtually zero. 
ROMANIA - Main economic indicators 
1989 1990 1991 Ql 
Gross Domestic Product, constant prices 
Industrial production (a) 
Agricultural production (a) 
Consumer price index (b) 
Unemployment rate, % of labour force 
Trade balance, $ bn 
Current account balance, $ bn 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn 
<a) -5 .8 
-5.3 
-5.9 
— 
— 
2.1 
2.5 
0.6 
-7.9 
-17.5 
5.0 
— 
— 
-3.1 
-3.1 
2.3 
— 
-15 
— 
80.4 
— 
-0.6 
-0 .5 
(a) Percentage change over (same period of) previous year. 
(b) Percentage increase since October 1990 (start of series). 
The conditions under which Romania embarked on economic 
reform were particularly difficult. The country had no net foreign 
debt, but this was achieved at a substantial human and economic 
cost. In recent years imports were kept very low; during the past 
decade virtually no western machinery was imported. Exports 
(most notably of agricultural goods) were stimulated, but they 
were made possible by repressed consumption at home. 
A deliberate policy was followed of holding down services and 
high technology in favour of heavy industry and manual labour. 
Moreover, significant resources were squandered on prestige 
projects. As a result, Romania's industrial infrastructure is among 
the most backward in Europe, and its work-force is particularly 
demoralized and badly trained. 
Initially, economic reform was slower than elsewhere in Central 
and Eastern Europe, in part because the government's limited 
popular support made it hesitate to take painful measures. On the 
contrary, during the first part of 1990, the authorities announced 
several measures designed more to alleviate the hardships imposed 
by the old regime than to stabilize the economy. The working week 
was reduced by 17%, more resources were channelled into 
consumption to the detriment of investment and exports, and 
some prices were lowered. As a result, output fell by 15 %, while 
national income declined 10-11 %, and investment by as much as 
35 %. The fact that food exports were halted and imports sharply 
raised to improve domestic supply, together with the disruptions in 
the domestic economy, led to a drop in exports of 42 % in 1990 
and a 50 % increase in imports. The 1989 trade surplus in 
convertible currencies of $2.6 billion was thus replaced by a $1.7 
billion deficit for 1990. 
Romania has traditionally been less dependent on cheap Soviet 
raw materials and energy than other CMEA countries, so the 
switch in its trade regime with the USSR towards world market 
prices and convertible currencies is having only a moderately 
negative impact. The Gulf situation and the consequent oil supply 
problems, on the other hand, have caused serious dislocations in 
the country's important petrochemical industry. Furthermore, 
Iraq is a significant debtor to Romania ($1.7 billion) and had 
undertaken to repay part of its debt in supplies of oil. Together 
with the sharp worsening of the trade balance, these effects have 
virtually wiped out the foreign exchange reserves. 
During October 1990 Prime Minister Roman obtained from 
parliament the authority to implement much more radical 
economic reform by decree. The first batch of reform measures 
was introduced on 1 November; others followed in April 1991 : 
• a partial price liberalization in November, with major 
exemptions for basic goods, rents etc., which led to an initial 
23.4 % increase in the retail price index; the announcement of 
further increases in January led to vociferous public protests and 
to delays; under IMF pressure a second round of increases was 
implemented on 1 April. By the end of April, consumer prices 
had risen by 128 % compared to October; 
• a 67 % devaluation on 1 November, to a rate of 35 Lei/$, 
followed by another devaluation to 60 Lei/$ in early April, and 
the announcement of a further devaluation in August ; inter-
bank currency auctions held since mid-February have yielded 
rates of about 200 Lei/$, close to the black market rate; 
• partial compensation for the inflationary effects of the two 
previous measures through direct transfers to workers and 
pensioners. Real wages declined by 24 % from October to 
April; 
• Restrictive budgetary policy; during the first quarter of 1991 a 
surplus of 31 billion Lei was recorded (2 % of GDP). 
• In early April, Parliament adopted a fairly liberal law on foreign 
direct investment. It allows for wholly foreign-owned companies 
in all sectors of the economy, and grants significant tax and 
import duty relief to investors ; profits may be repatriated in 
hard currency up to an amount of 8 to 15 % of the capital 
invested, depending on the sector of activity. 
Other planned reform measures include : 
• privatization of 50 % of state assets within three years, preceded 
by transformation of state enterprises into autonomous 
companies; 
• a modernization of the tax system, including the introduction of 
VAT. 
Soviet Union 
The collapse of the Soviet economy is accelerating. The 
breakdown of the state procurement system, without a concom-
itant development of a market economy, has increased shortages 
and weakened economic performance. 
The steady worsening in economic performance of the last five 
years accelerated in 1990. For the first time, official statistics 
showed a decline in GNP (by 2 %) and in national income (by 
4 %). Real Net Material Product fell during each quarter of last 
year, and economic performance in the first half of 1991 indicates 
a further marked deterioration in the economy. GNP declined by 
10 % with respect to the corresponding period of last year, Net 
Material Product by 12 %. A sharp reduction of industrial 
production (-6%) and agricultural production (-11%) was 
coupled with a strong decline in investment (-6 %), and 
productivity of labour (-11 %). 
SOVIET UNION - Main economic indicators 
Gross Domestic Product, current prices (a) 
Industrial production (a) 
Agricultural production (a) 
Consumer price index (a) 
Convertible trade balance, $ bn 
Convertible current account balance. $ bn 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn 
1989 
3.0 
1.7 
1.3 
2.0 
-0.2 
-0.2 
54.1 
1990 
-2.0 
-1.2 
-2.3 
5.0 
3.3 
1.4 
56.1 
1991 Ql 
-10.0 
-6.0 
-11.0 
23.8 
(a) Percentage change over (same period of) previous year. 
The decline in industrial production is particularly significant in 
branches like coal mining (-11 %), steel (-12 %) and oil (-9 %). 
This sharp decline can be ascribed to labour unrest, as well as to a 
complete disruption of links among enterprises. Living conditions 
have deteriorated further, with shortages of virtually all types of 
consumer goods and a flourishing black market. 
The 1990 budget deficit was officially reported at R58.1 billion 
(i.e., less than 6 % of GNP, and down R20 billion on 1989), but 
this is probably a substantial understatement. It appears that the 
budgetary situation in 1991 is much worse. First, many Republics 
have ceased to transfer to the central authorities taxes they used to 
collect on behalf of the Union. Second, subsidies on consumer 
prices had to be increased sharply because wholesale prices were 
raised in January to improve production incentives but retail 
prices were left unchanged during the first quarter. For the first 
five months of the year, the Union budget, i.e., the revenue and 
expenditure at the level of the federal government, showed a deficit 
of R39 billion, which is already higher than the R27 billion deficit 
officially projected for the year as a whole. 
Open inflation is on the increase. Compared to the same months of 
1990, wholesale price increases were 65 % in January, 85 % in 
February, 96% in March, and 112% in April. Retail prices, 
despite being under administrative control until 1 April, increased 
by 23.8 % in the first quarter of the year. An inflation rate of 
200% is reported for the first half of 1991. The partial price 
liberalization went into effect on 2 April under conditions of 
persisting shortage and repressed demand, which might well create 
conditions for hyperinflation. 
To mitigate the effects of the recent official price increases, an 
income indexation mechanism has been introduced. Wage-earners 
will in principle receive a once-and-for-all compensation for 85 % 
of the price increases ; a similar mechanism exists for pensioners. 
Still, the price rises imply an additional reduction in the standard 
of living of the portion of the population that depends on fixed 
incomes. Further changes in the indexation mechanism are under 
way. 
The main benefit from the price increases should be a reduction in 
the budget deficit : since incomes are not fully indexed, the decline 
in consumer price subsidies should more than offset the increase in 
income transfers. There is substantial ground for pessimism on this 
score, however. Already last year wages increased much faster 
than planned, as enterprises took more and more liberties with 
central wage policy guidelines. Moreover, any budgetary gains at 
the Union level could easily be wiped out by the loss of central 
control over the Republic budgets. If this were to occur, and in 
view of the ineffectiveness of monetary policy, the recent one-off 
price increases could well be followed by a period of hyperinf-
lation. 
The external situation of the Soviet Union deteriorated dramati-
cally in 1990. At mid-year a substantial deficit in trade with the 
West developed, but the central authorities managed to regain 
control over imports, and redirected much of their energy exports 
to the hard-currency area. Consequently, the trade deficit of RIO 
billion for 1990 is the result of a huge deficit in non-convertible 
trade, essentially with the former CMEA partners (R12 billion), 
only partially offset by a reported surplus in convertible currencies 
(R2 billion). In the first half of 1991 exports declined by 23 %, and 
imports by 48 %, mainly as a result of the collapse of CMEA 
trade. A trade surplus of R4.9 bn was recorded. 
The reluctance of western banks to extend credit because of the 
political unrest and the worsening economic situation was 
reinforced during the last part of 1990. Virtually none of the Soviet 
Union's short-term credits are being rolled over. The problem of 
arrears in the repayment of trade credits, which was temporarily 
reduced by western government loans and credit guarantees in the 
last months of 1990, has resurfaced ; arrears are now reported to 
amount to $5 billion. In the absence of access to private external 
credit, and with exports sharply down because of domestic supply 
disruptions, imports are severely constrained. The ensuing 
decrease in imported inputs will further aggravate the economic 
crisis. 
Prompted by the prospect of President Gorbachev's meeting with 
the G-7 leaders on 17 July, a number of agreements were reached 
and laws were passed in early July. 
First, 10 of the 15 Republics (all except the Baltic Republics, 
Georgia and Moldavia) signed the anti-crisis programme based 
upon the proposal prepared by Prime Minister Pavlov. Its main 
provisions were : 
• attempts to overcome the food crisis and stabilize the consumer 
market; 
• measures aimed at scaling down public expenditure, bringing 
the budget deficit under control; 
• the creation of an intergovernmental (Union/Republics) 
commission to draft proposals on the coordination of economic 
legislation, and on the sharing out of internal and external debt; 
• the introduction of tax incentives, VAT, curbing of subsidies to 
loss-making enterprises ; 
• a gradual price liberalization; 
• privatization ; specific Union and Republic programmes had yet 
to be drawn up but were intended to come into force during the 
third quarter of 1991 ; 
• the introduction of internal convertibility for the rouble by 1992. 
Second, a number of laws intended to speed up the transition to a 
market system were approved, both by the Supreme Soviet and by 
some Republic parliaments, though many details remained 
unclear: 
• a Union-wide framework law on foreign investment, devolving 
considerable regulatory power to the Republics; the Russian 
Federation approved its own law granting unimpeded transfer 
of profits; 
• a privatization law; 
• an anti-trust law; 
• a law regulating financial markets; 
• several laws (Union-wide and Republic) lowering profits tax ; in 
this context an unhealthy tax competition seemed to be 
developeding. 
On the whole, however, there was no clear indication of progress 
towards a true economic reform, and the measures that had been 
taken and proposed lacked coherence. Following the G7 summit 
in London, the USSR applied for membership of the IMF and the 
World Bank. 
Yugoslavia 
During the late 1980s, Yugoslavia's most acute economic problem 
was hyperinflation (2,500 % in 1989). In mid-December 1989, the 
government introduced a package of drastic stabilization 
measures : the exchange rate of the Dinar was fixed vis-à-vis the 
DM; full current-account convertibility was introduced; wages 
were frozen from November 1989 to June 1990; prices for some 
20-23 % of goods and services were frozen ; the instruments at the 
disposal of the central bank to implement a restrictive monetary 
policy were substantially strengthened ; the budgets of the various 
levels of government were in future to be financed by tax revenue. 
The initial results were positive. Price stability was achieved in 
April and maintained until June. However, prices began rising 
again during the autumn, mostly because of wage rises granted by 
the republics in contravention of federal economic policy 
guidelines and because of lack of adequate central monetary 
control. For 1990 as a whole, consumer prices rose by 120.4 per 
cent (December-to-December). The stabilization measures, along 
with the external shocks resulting from the Gulf conflict, pushed 
the economy into recession, with industrial output falling by 
10.6% and GNP by 7.5% in 1990. Widespread enterprise 
closures edged unemployment up to over 17 % in December 1990, 
and there was a significant drop in living standards. 
YUGOSLAVIA - Main economic indicators 
1989 
Real GSP (a) 0.7 
Industrial production (a) - 1.0 
Agricultural production (a) 4.5 
Consumer price index (a) 1256.0 
Unemployment rate, % of labour force 10.7 
Trade balance, ï bn - 1.5 
Current account balance, $ bn 2.4 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn 17.1 
1990 
-7.6 
-10.6 
-7.0 
588.0 
12.8 
-4.7 
-2 .4 
17.8 
1991 
Jan.-May 
— 
-17.6 
— 
77.6(b) 
— 
-0.6 
— 
15.9 
(a) Percentage change over (same period of) previous year. 
(b) Prices rose by 95.5% on a year-on-year basis (June 1990-June-1991). 
The fixing of the exchange rate and the introduction of current-
account convertibility, combined with the relaxation of import 
controls, resulted in a rapid growth of imports and a $4.6 bn trade 
deficit for 1990. The current account also recorded a deficit, 
following three consecutive years of surpluses and despite sizeable 
revenues from tourism and migrants' remittances. In response to 
complaints that the overvalued dinar was hurting exports, a new 
rate (9YD= 1DM) was set on 1 January 1991 and convertibility 
was severely circumscribed. However, on 20 April 1991 a further 
devaluation of the dinar was announced, by 31 % ( 13 YD = 1 DM). 
Foreign exchange reserves, having reached a record $9.6bn in 
October 1990, declined to $4.6bn in June 1991. 
Initial results for 1991 show a continuation of the negative trends 
evident in 1990. Industrial production dropped by 17.6 % during 
the first five months of 1991 on a year earlier. Exports fell by 4.9 % 
in the first five months, compared with the same period in 1990, 
while imports rose by 1.2 % resulting in a trade deficit of $988 mn. 
Inflation for January-June 1991 was 53 % (95.5 % for June 1990-
June 1991), and Prime Minister Markovic's forecast of a 70-80 % 
inflation rate for the 12 months to December will clearly not be 
attained. Finally the tourist industry, which earned $2.7bn in 1990 
(5 % of GNP) expects a collapse in revenues this year (-60 % in the 
first four months of 1991), and there has been a drop in 
remittances from Yugoslavs working abroad. 
The political turmoil in Yugoslavia entails serious economic 
consequences : trade between the republics has been curtailed and 
the single Yugoslav market is being put in question. At the same 
time, some republics have stopped payment of tax and customs 
revenues to the federal budget, exceeded planned public spending 
levels, granted excessive wage rises and illegally printed and issued 
banknotes. 
Disagreement among the republics, principally over the level of 
military spending, delayed the adoption of this year's federal 
budget. In early July the federal government finally adopted an 
emergency budget and a series of drastic policy measures aimed at 
preventing economic collapse. These include: 
• In the 1991 federal budget spending has been slashed from the 
planned YD 163 bn ($ 6.9 bn) to YD 100 bn ($ 4.25 bn). It will be 
financed by custom revenues and by the national bank and will 
be used exclusively to finance the state administration and the 
federal army. 
• The imposition of a tight monetary policy, to be implemented 
through a credit squeeze on the country's commercial banks. 
Credits will only be available for housing and for projects aimed 
at stimulating the growth of the private sector. 
• There will be no financing or subsidies for bankrupt state 
enterprises. 
The federal government also aims to secure at least $ 3 bn of 
external financing in order to meet the country's international 
obligations. However, the adoption of an emergency budget for 
1991 will not unblock a $ 1 bn stand-by credit from the IMF, which 
would in turn facilitate additional loans totalling $2.3 bn from 
other western financial institutions, unless the political crisis is 
resolved. The country's total debt was $17.8bn at the end of 1990. 
The price of Yugoslav debt on the secondary market has declined 
from 60 cents on the dollar in 1990 to under 40 cents in 1991. 
Because of the political turmoil, the United States has suspended 
its economic aid and has pledged to withdraw its support for loans 
and credits to Yugoslavia by international financial institutions. 
The European Community has also suspended assistance. 
1 August 1991 
Principal economie policy measures — July/August 1991 
Community (EUR 12) 
8.7 ECOF1N COUNCIL: The Council carried out the multilateral 
surveillance exercise envisaged under the convergence decision of March 1990 : 
Member States have been asked, where necessary, to submit medium-term 
convergence strategies before the end of October 1991. 
23.7 COMMUNITY REGIONAL POLICY : Three development program­
mes have been approved by the Commission for the adaptation and 
diversification of rural zones in France and Spain. 
25.7 1992 draft Community budget approved by the Council. 
Belgium (B) 
2.8 At the end of the 'budget conclave', an overall agreement is reached on 
the budget for 1992. The agreement envisages central government net 
borrowing of BFR 405,4 billion, i.e. 5.5% of GNP, which implies a BFR 50,6 
billion deficit for the Communities and Regions. In order to attain this target 
the government will make savings of BFR 82,5 billion. A large proportion 
comes from the Ministry of Finance itself: BFR 21,2 billion from modernizing 
the management of central government debt ; BFR 6,5 billion from the 
accelerated collection of unpaid taxes and the advance collection of a fraction 
of the withholding tax on earned income; BFR 6,7 billion within the 
department itself, i.e. mostly an increase in non-tax revenue. In addition, the 
government is planning to save BFR 16 billion in the social security sector. The 
balance of BFR 32 billion represents savings to be made by all ministerial 
departments. 
15.8 The National Bank raises its discount rate from 7,80% to 8%, in 
response to similar decisions in particular by the Bundesbank and the 
Nederlandsche Bank. 
Denmark (DK) 
None. 
Germany (D) 
15.8 The Bundesbank raises its discount rate from 6,5% to 7,5% and its 
Lombard rate from 9% to 9,25%. 
Greece (GR) 
2.7 and 30,7 Further measures aimed at the deregulation and liberalization 
of credit extension to the private sector and at the abolition of specific credit 
regulations and controls and the reinforcing of the supervisory role of the 
Bank of Greece. 
76.7 The ministerial Committee on Prices and Revenues adjusts the retail 
prices of oil products as follows: 
— leaded petrol from DRS 140/lt to DRS 125/lt, 
— unleaded petrol from DRS 130/lt to DRS 125/lt, 
— diesel from DRS 67/11 to DRS 89/lt. 
The increase in the price of diesel is a step in gradually adjusting the excise duty 
prevailing in Greece to the minimum level decided recently by the Council in 
the context of the harmonisation of indirect taxes. 
/5.7 New issue of Treasury bonds linked to ECU with a duration of two, 
three and four years and an interest rate of 10,10%, 10,25% and 10,40% p.a. 
respectively. New issue of Treasury bonds linked to USD with a duration of 
two, three and four years and an interest rate of 8,0% and 9,0% p.a. 
respectively. 
9.8 The Bank of Greece decides that the banks are obliged to publicly 
announce their base interest rates, commissions and fees as well as taxes and 
levies for all banking operations. 
22.8 By Ministerial decision a set of criteria and procedures were set based on 
which the tax authorities will carry out extensive controls among self-
employed, craftsmen, shopkeepers, liberal professions and farmers. 
29.8 The parliament votes a bill on rent regulation with respect to property 
rent for professional use. 
Spain (E) 
5.7 In order to keep the increase in the public deficit for 1991 within the limits 
laid down, the government cuts the expenditure planned in the central 
government budget for 1991 by PTA 341 billion (0,6% of GDP). 
18.7 The Treasury increases the interest rate on 12-month Treasury bills 
(Letras del Tesoro) by 0,3 points to 12%. 
1.8 Further 0,3 point increase in the interest rate on 12-month Treasury bills, 
taking it to 12,34%. 
23.8 The Bank of Spain cuts the official intervention rate by 0,15 points to 
12,6%. 
29.8 The Treasury increases the interest rates on three, five and ten year 
Treasury bonds by some 0,4 points to 11,72%, 11,68% and 12,67% 
respectively. 
France 
24.7 The government approves a package of measures to assist the textile 
and clothing industry which include extending the tax credit available for 
research to the costs involved in creating collections, a greater drive to 
redevelop textile regions and recourse to short-time working combined with 
State aid at rates close to the authorized ceiling. 
23.7 The government increases the allocation for Codevi (industrial 
development account loans to small businesses SMEs) from FF 16 billion to 
FF 25 billion with efTect from 1 August. At the same time the Codevi ceiling is 
raised from FF 10 000 to FF 25 000, banks cut the top rate for such loans from 
9,25% to 8,75% and the maximum turnover threshold for firms eligible for 
financing out of Codevi resources is raised from FF 100 million to FF 500 
million. According to the authorities, these measures are part of a more 
comprehensive plan for measures to support small businesses to be announced 
in September. 
20.7 The government increases Paris transport charges by 5,8% with effect 
from 1 August. This rise is 2,5% higher than the official inflation forecast and 
is in line with the public authorities' intention to bring public transport prices 
in the Ile de France, which are subsidized far more heavily than in the main 
provincial towns, gradually nearer to their true cost. 
Ireland (IRL) 
19.7 In the light of half-year exchequer returns indicating a substantial 
overshoot in the target for net borrowing, the Government announces a 
package of additional measures designed to achieve savings oflRL 100 million 
this year. The savings are being found in current expenditure, mainly on 
health, education and social welfare and are expected to limit the borrowing 
overshoot to IRL 100 million. 
2J.7 Central bank reduces official short term rate by half a point to 1034%. 
Italy (I) 
7.7 Parliament gives its final approval to the reform of the Wage 
Supplementation Fund. According to the new provisions, the scheme will be 
applicable to industrial firms with a maximum of 15 employees and will have a 
maximum duration of 2 years (with a possible extension of two further years). 
Collective dismissal ('mobility') procedures have also been modified : workers 
dismissed will be entitled to the same treatment provided for by the Wage 
Supplementation Fund for a maximum of three years. 
Luxembourg (L) 
5.8 The government presents the outlines of its draft budget for 1992 which 
will be tabled in Parliament on 18 September. The government envisages a 
GDP volume growth rate of 3,8% and an inflation rate of 3,3%. Gross overall 
revenue is estimated at LFR 116,4 billion, a 6,7% increase on the budget for 
1991. Gross expenditure is projected to be LFR 114,9 billion, up 6,4%. The 
budget will therefore close with a surplus of LFR 1,5 billion. 
Netherlands (NL) 
2.7 Parliament gives its agreement to a government proposal to increase the 
excise duties on fuel from 6 July. The price of leaded petrol will go up by 31 
cents, unleaded petrol by 22 cents and gasoil by 8 cents. 
15.8 The Nederlandsche Bank raises its discount rate from 7,75% to 8% and 
its secured loans rate from 8,50% to 8,75%. This increase is in line with those 
made by other central banks, in particular the Bundesbank and the Belgian 
National Bank. 
Portugal (P) 
5.7 The Bank of Portugal announces that non-resident investors will not be 
allowed to purchase floating-rate bonds quoted on the stock exchange before 
the end of the year. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
12.7 The Bank of England acts to cut bank base rates by a half-percentage 
point to 11%. Building societies and banks subsequently announce that their 
mortgage interest rates would also drop by Vz% to around 12%. 
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